文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Can non-executive equity incentives reduce internal control ineffectiveness? Evidence from China

作者：Zhang, Dunli[1];Zhang, Ting[1];Ma, Guanghua[2]

第一作者：Zhang, Dunli

通讯作者：Zhang, T[1]

机构：[1]Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Accounting, Wuhan, Peoples R China;[2]Xinxiang Univ, Sch Business, Xinxiang, Henan, Peoples R China

第一机构：Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Accounting, Wuhan, Peoples R China

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Accounting, Wuhan, Peoples R China.

年份：2020

卷号：60

期号：5

起止页码：4467-4496

外文期刊名：ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

收录：;Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85086246527);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000539298300001)】；

基金：This study is supported by Training project for Renowned Accounting Experts of the Ministry of Finance; The Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law (Grant No. 201911137).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Equity incentives; Internal control weaknesses; Internal environment; Internal supervision system; Non-executive employees

摘要：Using data from Chinese listed firms for the period 2012-2018, we provide new evidence that the intensity of non-executive equity incentives can reduce the likelihood of internal control weaknesses and improve internal control effectiveness. We also find that internal control weaknesses are more likely to be remedied in firms that implement strong non-executive equity incentive polices. Besides, we document novel results that employee equity incentives for non-executives can optimise the internal environment, improve the internal supervision system, and thereby reduce the operational-level weaknesses of a company's internal controls.