文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：A Coalitional Game Mechanism of Tasks Execution Considering Trust Relationship among CRPs in Clouds

作者：Xu, Lijun[1];Liu, Yanjun[1]

通讯作者：Xu, LJ[1]

机构：[1]Xinxiang Univ, Sch Comp & Informat Engn, Xinxiang 453003, Peoples R China

第一机构：新乡学院计算机与信息工程学院

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Xinxiang Univ, Sch Comp & Informat Engn, Xinxiang 453003, Peoples R China.|[1107118]新乡学院计算机与信息工程学院;[11071]新乡学院;

年份：2016

卷号：9

期号：11

起止页码：297-307

外文期刊名：INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GRID AND DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING

收录：EI(收录号：20165103139345);Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85027027782);WOS:【ESCI(收录号:WOS:000397937000025)】；

基金：The work was supported by the project of Science and technology research of henan province (152102210202), Institutions of higher learning key research projects in henan province department of education (15A520094), Science and Technology Innovation Fund of Xinxiang University (15ZA03).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Cloud computing; Tasks scheduling; Coalitional game; Trust relationship

摘要：Cloud Resource Providers (CRPs) can form CRPs coalitions for executing large scale application tasks by pooling their resources together in cloud computing. However, forming such CRPs coalitions is a challenging problem especially when the trust relationships among CRPs have to be taken into account. Aiming at this problem, we model the formation of CRPs coalitions by considering the trust and reputation of the participanting CRPs in clouds in this paper. An algorithm TCFA for coalition formation is proposed, which can enable the CRPs with high reputation to join into a coalition reducing the cost of execution and guaranteeing the maximum profit for the participanting CRPs. Furthermore, we prove that the formed coalition determined by TCFA is stable, which means that the CRPs that are the part of the coalition do not have incentives to break away from it. Meanwhile, we prove that TCFA can produce a Pareto optimal solution. The results of simulation experiments show that our algorithm TCFA not only can produce stable coalitions structure composed of CRPs with higher reputation, but also can obtain higher individual profit among coalitional members.