详细信息
文献类型:期刊文献
中文题名:地方政府跨界环境污染治理博弈分析
英文题名:Game analysis on transboundary pollution control of local government
作者:张跃胜[1,2]
第一作者:张跃胜
机构:[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院;[2]新乡学院管理学刊编辑部
第一机构:西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061
年份:2016
卷号:37
期号:5
起止页码:96-101
中文期刊名:河北经贸大学学报
外文期刊名:Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
收录:国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2014】;CSSCI:【CSSCI2014_2016】;
基金:国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AZD103);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(15JZD012)
语种:中文
中文关键词:跨界环境污染;环境治理;外部性;长江流域;博弈分析;帕累托最优;公地悲剧;纳什均衡
外文关键词:Transboundary Environmental Pollution; Environmental Governance; Externality; Yangtze River Basin; Game Analy-sis; Pareto Optimality; Tragedy of Commons; Nash Equilibrium;
摘要:跨界环境污染会加剧环境资源配置的扭曲和分配的不公平。基于环境污染扩散范围,构建多地区参与的跨界环境污染治理博弈模型,博弈模型中个体目标最优和集体目标最优的冲突表明:纳什均衡最优的跨界环境污染治理投入小于帕累托最优的跨界环境污染治理投入,二者呈现相背离状态,并且背离程度随着参与跨界环境污染治理地区的增加而增加,导致"囚徒困境"和"公地悲剧"局面。
Transboundary environmental pollution will aggravate distortions and unfair distribution of the environmental re-sources . Thus,to begin with,construct the game model of transboundary environmental pollution involving multi-regions,which are based on its diffusion range. And the conflict between the optimization of individual goals and collectives’ indicates: the optimal investment of Nash equilibrium is smaller than that is in Pareto,and the two presents the departure,what’s serious,the more areas get involved in,the deviate degree becomes deeper,which leads to the "prisoner’s dilemma" and "tragedy of the commons" situation.
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